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OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
PORTER, Circuit Judge.  
 The University of the Sciences (“USciences”) is a 
private college in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. John Doe, a 
student at USciences, had completed nearly all the coursework 
required to earn a degree in biomedical science. Before Doe 
could finish his degree, two female students accused him of 
violating USciences’s Sexual Misconduct Policy (the 
“Policy”). After investigating Doe, USciences concluded that 
he violated the Policy and expelled him.  
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Doe filed a lawsuit in the District Court alleging that 
USciences was improperly motivated by sex when it 
investigated and enforced the Policy against him. Doe also 
asserted that USciences breached its contract with him by 
failing to provide him the fairness promised to students under 
the Policy. The District Court dismissed Doe’s complaint. 
Doe’s complaint contains plausible allegations 
supporting both claims. So we will reverse the District Court’s 
order dismissing Doe’s complaint. 
I 
A 
 USciences distributes to its students a series of policies 
governing disciplinary issues. These documents include the 
Student Handbook and the Policy, which USciences considers 
“companion documents.” App. 191. The Student Handbook 
promises that USciences will “[e]ngag[e] in investigative 
inquiry and resolution of reports that are adequate, reliable, 
impartial, prompt, fair and equitable[.]” App. 149 (emphasis 
added). And the Student Handbook states that USciences will 
“[s]upport[ ] complainants and respondents equally[.]” Id.  
 The Policy specifically addresses allegations of sexual 
misconduct. Like the Student Handbook, the Policy makes the 
same promises about providing fairness to accused students. 
The Policy also includes substantive rules governing 
prohibited misconduct and procedures that outline the process 
for investigating and adjudicating alleged violations of the 
Policy. 
1 
The Policy forbids students from engaging in 
“prohibited conduct.” App. 123. One form of prohibited 
conduct is sexual assault, which “consists of sexual contact 
and/or sexual intercourse that occurs without affirmative 
consent.” Id. A student gives affirmative consent “through the 
demonstration of clear and coherent words or actions[ ] . . . 
indicat[ing] permission to engage in mutually agreed-upon 
sexual activity.” App. 124.  
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The Policy states that certain circumstances may 
undermine a student’s ability to give affirmative consent. For 
example, “[a]ffirmative consent cannot be gained by taking 
advantage of the incapacitation of another, where the person 
initiating sexual activity knew or reasonably should have 
known that the other was incapacitated.” Id. Incapacitation 
occurs when “a person lacks the ability to make informed, 
rational judgments about whether or not to engage in sexual 
activity.” Id. A student may become “incapacitated as a result 
of the consumption of alcohol or other drugs[.]” Id.  
The Policy also forbids students from revealing 
confidential information after a formal investigation begins. 
The “consequences” for violating the confidentiality provision 
“may include suspension or dismissal from USciences, being 
barred from residing on campus, or being prohibited from 
participating in extracurricular activities, including varsity 
athletics.” App. 142. 
2 
USciences “deem[s itself] to have had notice [of alleged 
sexual misconduct] if a responsible employee knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known, about [sexual] 
misconduct.” App. 128. A “responsible employee” is defined 
as “any employee who is required to share all reports of sexual 
misconduct with [USciences] administrative officials (i.e., 
Title IX Coordinator/Deputy Coordinator).” Id. The Title IX 
Coordinator is responsible for the “[o]versight of a prompt, 
fair, [and] equitable investigation and resolution process for 
reports of prohibited conduct at [USciences].” App. 122. 
If the Title IX Coordinator decides to launch a formal 
investigation into alleged sexual misconduct, USciences 
employs the so-called “single-investigator model.” Under that 
model, USciences hires an outside attorney to serve as an 
investigator. USciences then tasks the investigator with 
interviewing witnesses, gathering evidence, and determining 
the accused’s culpability. USciences, however, does not offer 
the accused student, or the “respondent,” a chance to cross-
examine witnesses or the opportunity to participate in any sort 
of live, adversarial hearing in which he or she may put on a 
defense or otherwise challenge the investigator’s findings.  
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 If the investigator determines that the respondent 
violated the Policy, he or she will not make a recommendation 
on any sanctions. Instead, a three-person panel appointed by 
the Title IX Coordinator—the Title IX Administrative Panel—
will issue a letter detailing the sanctions imposed on the 
respondent.  
The Policy permits certain appeals. For instance, a 
student may appeal if he “believes the decision regarding 
responsibility was in error[.]” App. 141. If the respondent 
timely files his appeal, the Title IX Coordinator “will convene 
a Title IX Appeals Panel,” which is “a [three-person] panel of 
appropriately trained faculty and staff[.]” Id. The Title IX 
Appeals Panel “may request clarification on the facts from the 
investigator[ ].” Id. “If no merit is found,” the panel “will 
notify the Title IX Coordinator that the [a]ppeal will not move 
forward.” Id.  
B 
Two female students at USciences, Jane Roe 1 and Jane 
Roe 2, filed formal complaints alleging that Doe committed 
sexual misconduct in violation of the Policy. As for Doe’s 
allegations about his encounter with Roe 1, she and Doe knew 
each other for more than a year as of the fall 2017 semester. At 
the time, Roe 1 had been in an “open relationship” with a 
student at a different university. App. 97. On November 3, 
2017, Roe 1 and Doe discussed over Snapchat her desire for 
someone “to provide physical affection in the absence of her 
boyfriend.” Id. Doe invited Roe 1 to his home, and she 
accepted his invitation. In doing so, Roe 1 understood that they 
may engage in sexual activity.  
 Roe 1 arrived at Doe’s house between 11:00 p.m. and 
12:00 a.m. Doe alleges that they engaged in consensual sexual 
intercourse and then fell asleep in Doe’s bed. His complaint 
also states that, during the night, Roe 1 and Doe engaged in 
sexual intercourse at least two more times. Nine months later, 
in August 2018, Roe 1 and Witness 1, the president of Roe 1’s 
sorority, reported to USciences that Doe sexually assaulted 
Roe 1. Specifically, Roe 1 alleged that all their sexual 
encounters on that night were consensual except for their last 
one, which she claimed was not consensual because Doe did 
not use a condom.  
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As for Doe’s allegations about his encounter with Roe 
2, she and Doe had a “friends with benefits” relationship 
throughout the fall 2017 semester. App. 99. Over that time, 
they had consensual sexual intercourse about ten times, 
including after parties. At the beginning of the spring 2018 
semester, Doe and his roommates hosted a party. Doe alleges 
that he asked Roe 2 if she wanted to come to the party and then 
spend the night with him; Roe 2 agreed. Roe 2 attended the 
party, and both Doe and Roe 2 consumed alcohol. Specifically, 
Roe 2 recalls drinking “three or four” cups of “juice,” App. 
212, a cocktail made of vodka and mixers. Doe recalls having 
three or four cups of beer and a cup of “juice.” App. 251.  
During the party, Roe 2 was elbowed on the dance floor, 
fell, and bloodied her nose. Doe tried to assist her. Afterwards, 
Doe asked Roe 2 if she wanted to lay down in his room and 
spend the night. Roe 2 agreed. Doe alleges that he and Roe 2 
then went to his room, where they soon had sexual intercourse. 
Doe alleges that Roe 2 was “an active participant” and “fully 
engaged the entire time.” App. 100. Seven months later, in 
August 2018, Roe 2 reported that Doe had sexually assaulted 
her during the party. She alleged that she passed out in Doe’s 
bedroom and woke up to him having nonconsensual sexual 
intercourse with her.  
C 
In his complaint, Doe alleges that USciences “permitted 
and encouraged” Roe 1 and Witness 1 to disclose confidential 
information about Roe 1’s complaint “to find other women 
willing to make a complaint against” him. App. 98. Doe further 
alleges that, after Roe 1 reported him to USciences, she and 
Witness 1 “convinced” their sorority sister, Roe 2, to file her 
own complaint against him. App. 98–99. Within days, Roe 2 
reported that Doe committed sexual assault during their 
January 2018 “hookup.” App. 195.  
A member of the Title IX Coordinator’s team 
determined that if Roe 1’s and Roe 2’s allegations were true, 
then Doe would have violated the Policy. For that reason, the 
Title IX Coordinator gave Doe a Notice of Sexual Misconduct 
Investigation, which notified him that Roe 1 and Roe 2 had 
accused him of sexual assault. According to Doe’s complaint, 
“the Notice did not provide [Doe] with any specifics about the 
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allegations against him despite the fact that [USciences] 
possessed specific details about the allegations against [him].” 
App. 101. 
USciences retained a Philadelphia attorney to serve as 
the investigator. The investigator interviewed Roe 1, Roe 2, 
Doe, and ten witnesses. She also conducted follow-up 
interviews with Roe 1, Roe 2, and Doe. After completing her 
investigation, the investigator credited the allegations made by 
Roe 1 and Roe 2 and concluded that Doe violated the Policy 
by engaging in sexual intercourse without Roe 1’s or Roe 2’s 
affirmative consent. A Title IX Administrative Panel expelled 
Doe. Doe appealed to a Title IX Appeals Panel, but it denied 
his appeal. 
Doe then sued USciences. He alleges that USciences 
violated Title IX and breached its contract with him. The 
District Court dismissed Doe’s complaint. He timely appealed.  
II 
 The District Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over 
Doe’s case under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1367. We have 
jurisdiction over Doe’s appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. And 
we exercise de novo review over the grant of a motion to 
dismiss. Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 809 F.3d 780, 786 n.2 
(3d Cir. 2016).  
 To survive a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain “a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must 
set forth enough factual allegations to “state a claim to relief 
that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 
U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A facially plausible claim is one that 
permits a reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for 
the misconduct alleged. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 
(2009). When assessing the merits of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, 
we accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint and 
view those facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. Umland v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 
(3d Cir. 2008). 
8 
 
 “To decide a motion to dismiss, courts generally 
consider only the allegations contained in the complaint, 
exhibits attached to the complaint[,] and matters of public 
record.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 
Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). In addition, “a 
document integral to or explicitly relied upon in the complaint 
may be considered without converting the motion to dismiss 
into one for summary judgment.” In re Burlington Coat 
Factory Sec. Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) 
(internal quotation marks, citation, and emphasis omitted). 
Because the investigator’s report, which USciences attached to 
its motion to dismiss, is integral to Doe’s complaint, we may 
consider the report.  
III 
Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 states 
that “[n]o person . . . shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded 
from participation in, be denied the benefits of,  or be subjected 
to discrimination under any education program or activity 
receiving [f]ederal financial assistance[.]” 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a). “Because Title IX prohibits . . . subjecting a person 
to discrimination on account of sex, it is understood to bar the 
imposition of university discipline [when sex] is a motivating 
factor in the decision to discipline.” Doe v. Columbia Univ., 
831 F.3d 46, 53 (2d Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks, 
alteration, and citation omitted). No one disputes that 
USciences receives federal financial assistance under Title IX 
and that, by expelling Doe, it “excluded [him] from 
participation in [or] denied [him] the benefits of . . . [an] 
education program.” See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).  
Some Courts of Appeals have examined Title IX claims 
using the doctrinal framework announced by the Second 
Circuit in Yusuf v. Vassar College, 35 F.3d 709 (2d Cir. 1994).1 
Yusuf recognized two theories under which one may allege a 
 
1 See, e.g., Doe v. Valencia Coll., 903 F.3d 1220, 1236 (11th 
Cir. 2018); Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 575, 585 (6th Cir. 2018); 
Doe v. Trs. of Boston Coll., 892 F.3d 67, 90–91 (1st Cir. 2018); 
Plummer v. Univ. of Houston, 860 F.3d 767, 777 (5th Cir. 




Title IX violation: erroneous outcome and selective 
enforcement. Id. at 715. The Sixth Circuit added two additional 
theories: deliberate indifference and archaic assumptions. Doe 
v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 589 (6th Cir. 2018). In Doe v. 
Purdue University, 928 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 2019), the Seventh 
Circuit observed that “[a]ll of these [theories] simply describe 
ways in which a plaintiff might show that sex was a motivating 
factor in a university’s decision to discipline a student.” Id. at 
667. Ultimately, the Seventh Circuit “ask[ed] the question 
more directly: do the alleged facts, if true, raise a plausible 
inference that the university discriminated against [the student] 
‘on the basis of sex’?” Id. at 667–68. 
 We agree with the Seventh Circuit and “see no need to 
superimpose doctrinal tests on the [Title IX] statute.” See id. at 
667. Thus, we adopt the Seventh Circuit’s straightforward 
pleading standard and hold that, to state a claim under Title IX, 
the alleged facts, if true, must support a plausible inference that 
a federally-funded college or  university discriminated against 
a person on the basis of sex. Although parties are free to 
characterize their claims however they wish, this standard 
hews most closely to the text of Title IX. See 20 U.S.C. 
§ 1681(a). 
 Doe’s complaint contains plausible allegations 
supporting the reasonable inference that USciences 
discriminated against him on account of his sex. His 
allegations fit into two categories. First, Doe alleges that 
USciences yielded to external pressure when implementing 
and enforcing the Policy. Second, he alleges that sex was a 
motivating factor in USciences’s investigation and decision to 
impose discipline.  
 To begin, Doe plausibly contends that USciences, in its 
implementation and enforcement of the Policy, succumbed to 
pressure from the federal government. Doe alleges that, after 
the United States Department of Education (“DoEd”) issued 
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the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter,2 USciences “limited 
procedural protections afforded to male students like [Doe] in 
sexual misconduct cases.” App. 96. He further alleges that 
USciences, “encouraged by federal officials, has instituted 
solutions to sexual violence against women that abrogate the 
civil rights of men and treat men differently than women.” 
App. 109.  
The 2011 Dear Colleague Letter “ushered in a more 
rigorous approach to campus sexual misconduct allegations.” 
Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 668. Three of our sister circuits have 
found that alleged university overreaction to DoEd or other 
public pressure is relevant to alleging a plausible Title IX 
discrimination claim. See id. at 668–69; Doe v. Baum, 903 F.3d 
575, 586 (6th Cir. 2018); Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 594; 
Columbia Univ., 831 F.3d at 58. Like our colleagues on the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits, we also recognize that allegations 
about pressure from DoEd and the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter 
cannot alone support a plausible claim of Title IX sex 
discrimination. See Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 669 (“That said, 
the letter, standing alone, is obviously not enough to get [the 
plaintiff] over the plausibility line.” (citation omitted)); Baum, 
903 F.3d at 586 (noting that pressure from DoEd “alone is not 
enough to state a claim that the university acted with bias in 
this particular case”). 
Doe also claims that USciences was improperly 
motivated by sex when it investigated him but chose not to 
investigate three female students who allegedly violated the 
Policy: Roe 2, Roe 1, and Witness 1. As for Roe 2, Doe alleges 
that USciences “[e]ngaged in selective investigation and 
enforcement of [its] policies by failing to consider [Doe’s] 
alcohol consumption and whether [Roe] 2 should have been 
charged with violations of [the Policy] if [Doe] was intoxicated 
when they had sex[.]” App. 104. According to the 
investigator’s report, Roe 2 and Doe consumed between three 
 
2 See United States Department of Education, Office of the 






and five drinks each.3 Doe further alleges that “[a]lthough both 
[he] and [Roe] 2 had been drinking [during the party], 
[USciences] identified [Doe] as the initiator of sexual activity, 
notwithstanding the comparable intoxication of both 
participants.” App. 110.4  
Drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most 
favorable to Doe, as we must at this stage, it is plausible that, 
as he alleges, sex was a motivating factor in USciences’s 
investigation and decision to expel him. Under the Policy, 
USciences considers itself to have notice of potential sexual 
misconduct whenever a responsible employee knows or 
reasonably should know about the misconduct. See App. 133, 
134, 137. And even though USciences never investigated Roe 
2, Doe plausibly alleges that, at the latest, USciences had notice 
that she may have violated the Policy when the investigator 
submitted her report to the Title IX coordinator. See Miami 
Univ., 882 F.3d at 596. 
 
3 The District Court erred when it noted that it was “skeptical” 
of Doe’s claim “because it appears to flow from a faulty 
premise—namely, the consumption of any alcohol renders a 
person unable to give affirmative consent under the” Policy. 
App. 16. Doe’s argument does not “flow from a faulty 
premise,” but from his allegations and the reasonable 
inferences that can be drawn from them. By indulging its 
skepticism, the District Court misapplied the familiar standard 
that governs motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). To the 
contrary, the District Court should have viewed the allegations 
in Doe’s complaint in the light most favorable to him and 
drawn all reasonable inferences from those allegations in his 
favor. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Umland 
v. PLANCO Fin. Servs., Inc., 542 F.3d 59, 64 (3d Cir. 2008). 
4 Doe initially told the investigator that his sexual encounter 
with Roe 2 was mutually consensual. See, e.g., App. 252 
(“[Doe] state[d] that [Roe 2] fully participated in the sex and 
he had no doubt about her consent.”). But under the Policy, 
Doe’s allegation that he and Roe 2 were comparably 
intoxicated undermined his ability to give affirmative consent, 
just as it impaired hers. See Doe v. Miami Univ., 882 F.3d 579, 
596 (6th Cir. 2018). 
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 Doe also contends that USciences was motivated by sex 
when it chose not to investigate Roe 1 and Witness 1—both 
female students—despite having notice that both allegedly 
violated the Policy. In his complaint, Doe alleges that Roe 1 
and Witness 1 breached the Policy’s confidentiality provision 
by colluding with each other about the investigation. Under the 
Policy, “[i]f it is determined that anyone involved in a report 
or complaint either as a complainant, respondent[,] or 
witness[ ] colluded or shared information with another, 
sanctions may be imposed by USciences.” App. 142. 
According to Doe’s complaint, Roe 1 and Witness 1 
“disclose[d] information about [Roe] 1’s complaint . . . in an 
effort to find other women willing to make a complaint 
against” him. App. 98. And Doe alleges that USciences knew 
that Roe 1 and Witness 1 violated the Policy because 
USciences “permitted and encouraged” them to disclose 
confidential information in order to recruit Roe 2 to file a 
complaint against him. Id.  
 Doe plausibly alleges that USciences enforced the 
Policy against him alone because of his sex. In Baum, the court 
found that the plaintiff stated a viable claim because, “[w]hen 
viewing th[e] evidence in the light most favorable to [the 
accused student], . . . one plausible explanation is that the 
[b]oard discredited all males, including [the accused student], 
and credited all females, including [the accuser], because of 
[sex] bias.” 903 F.3d at 586. Doe’s allegations of sex-
motivated investigation and enforcement are like the plausible 
allegations in Baum. And when Doe’s allegations about 
selective investigation and enforcement are combined with his 
allegations related to pressure applied by the 2011 Dear 
Colleague Letter, we conclude that he states a plausible claim 
of sex discrimination. See Purdue, 928 F.3d at 668–70; Baum, 
903 F.3d at 586–87. For these reasons, we will reverse the 




 Next, we turn to Doe’s breach-of-contract claim. Under 
Pennsylvania law,5 “three elements are necessary to plead a 
cause of action for breach of contract: (1) the existence of a 
contract, including its essential terms[;] (2) a breach of the 
contract; and[ ] (3) resultant damages.” Meyer, Darragh, 
Buckler, Bebenek & Eck, P.L.L.C. v. Law Firm of Malone 
Middleman, P.C., 137 A.3d 1247, 1258 (Pa. 2016) (citation 
omitted). The parties do not dispute that the relationship 
between USciences and Doe is contractual. See Barker v. Trs. 
of Bryn Mawr Coll., 122 A. 220, 221 (Pa. 1923). Likewise, 
USciences does not dispute that, if it breached its contract with 
Doe, that breach would have caused damages. Thus, we focus 
our analysis on whether USciences breached a duty imposed 
by its contract with Doe. As explained below, we conclude that 
Doe states a plausible breach-of-contract claim.  
A 
In the Student Handbook, USciences promises all 
students that it will “[e]ngag[e] in investigative inquiry and 
resolution of reports that are adequate, reliable, impartial, 
prompt, fair and equitable[.]” App. 149. USciences also 
promises in the Student Handbook to “[s]upport[ ] 
complainants and respondents equally[.]” Id. USciences makes 
these same promises in the companion Policy. App. 168. The 
Policy also tasks the Title IX Coordinator with the 
responsibility of overseeing “a prompt, fair, [and] equitable 
investigation and resolution process for reports of prohibited 
conduct at [USciences].” App. 122. And the Student Handbook 
states that “[p]rocedures and rights in student conduct 
[proceedings] are conducted with fairness to all, but do not 
include all of the same protections afforded by the courts.” 
App. 150. 
 
5 The parties assume that Pennsylvania contract-interpretation 
principles govern their contract, and we agree.  See, e.g., In re 
Remicade (Director Purchaser) Antitrust Litig., 938 F.3d 515, 
523 n.5 (3d Cir. 2019) (interpreting a collective bargaining 
agreement under New Jersey law because the parties assumed 
New Jersey law applied).   
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 USciences contends that the fairness promised in the 
Student Handbook and the Policy consists of the procedures 
provided by those documents. USciences essentially argues 
that because it provided some procedural protections in the 
Policy, Doe was treated fairly. We disagree. “[I]n determining 
the intent of the contracting parties, all provisions in the 
agreement will be construed together and each will be given 
effect.” LJL Transp., Inc. v. Pilot Air Freight Corp., 962 A.2d 
639, 647–48 (Pa. 2009) (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
Nowhere in either the Policy or the Student Handbook is 
fairness defined, let alone explicitly defined as the procedural 
protections contained in the Student Handbook and the Policy. 
Because the fairness promised in the Student Handbook and 
the Policy must “be given effect,” see id., we reject 
USciences’s circular argument. 
B 
Given that neither the Student Handbook nor the Policy 
defines fairness, we must construe that promise as a matter of 
contract interpretation. “When interpreting a contract, the 
court’s paramount goal is to ascertain and give effect to the 
intent of the parties as reasonably manifested by the language 
of their written agreement.” Halpin v. LaSalle Univ., 639 A.2d 
37, 39 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (citations omitted). When “the 
contract evidences care in its preparation, it will be presumed 
that [the contract’s] words were employed deliberately and 
with intention. In determining what the parties intended by 
their contract, the law must look to what they clearly expressed. 
Courts in interpreting a contract do not assume that its 
language was chosen carelessly.” Steuart v. McChesney, 444 
A.2d 659, 662 (Pa. 1982) (internal quotation marks and 
citations omitted).  
The plain meaning of the word “fair” is “just, unbiased, 
equitable, legitimate, in accordance with rules.” See Fair, The 
Concise Oxford Dictionary 347 (7th ed. 1982). Here, the 
fairness promised by the Student Handbook and the Policy 
relates to procedural protections for students accused of sexual 
misconduct, and Doe alleges that he did not receive a “fair and 
impartial hearing.” App. 114. In this context, a “fair hearing” 
or “fair process” “is a term of art used to describe a ‘judicial or 
administrative hearing conducted in accordance with due 
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process.’” Wojchowski v. Daines, 498 F.3d 99, 102 n.5 (2d Cir. 
2007) (quoting Fair hearing, Black’s Law Dictionary 738 (8th 
ed. 1999)).  
Doe’s allegations of unfairness arise in a breach-of-
contract claim between two private parties—a private 
university and one of its students. Under those circumstances, 
courts are sometimes chary about reviewing too closely the 
manner in which a private university chooses to investigate and 
discipline its students. That is especially appropriate for 
matters uniquely within the institution’s province, such as 
academic integrity or faculty development and discipline. See, 
e.g., Reardon v. Allegheny Coll., 926 A.2d 477, 480 n.2 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 2007) (discussing Murphy v. Duquesne Univ. of the 
Holy Ghost, 777 A.2d 418 (Pa. 2001)); Boehm v. Univ. of Pa. 
Sch. of Veterinary Med., 573 A.2d 575, 579–82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1990).  
This is not such a case. The investigation and fair 
adjudication of alleged criminal activity like sexual assault is 
not uniquely within the province of colleges and universities. 
Yet accused “students have a substantial interest at stake when 
it comes to school disciplinary hearings for sexual 
misconduct,” Baum, 903 F.3d at 582, because the 
consequences are potentially dire and permanent: “[a] finding 
of responsibility for a sexual offense can have a ‘lasting 
impact’ on a student’s personal life, in addition to his 
‘educational and employment opportunities,’ especially when 
the disciplinary action involves a long-term suspension.” 
Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 600 (citation omitted). Under the 
Policy, for example, students accused of sexual misconduct 
face grave consequences, including a suspension of up to two 
years or—as in Doe’s case—permanent expulsion.  
Moreover, this case and others like it differ from 
garden-variety breach-of-contract disputes involving colleges 
and universities because of the impact of the 2011 Dear 
Colleague Letter and colleges’ and universities’ reactions to it. 
Although the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter was provided as 
“guidance,” DoEd backed it up by investigating alleged 
noncompliance. An official from DoEd’s Office of Civil 
Rights (“OCR”) warned that “[s]ome schools still are failing 
their students by responding inadequately to sexual assaults on 
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campus. For those schools, my office [in DoEd] and [the] 
Administration have made it clear that the time for delay is 
over.” Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 668 (citing Examining Sexual 
Assault on Campus, Focusing on Working to Ensure Student 
Safety, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, 
and Pensions, 113th Cong. 7 (2014) (statement of Catherine 
Lhamon, Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights, U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ.)). That official cautioned that OCR was “committed to 
using all its tools to ensure that all schools comply with [T]itle 
IX so campuses will be safer for students across the country.” 
Id. To ensure compliance, OCR put all of “a school’s federal 
funding . . . at risk if [the school] could not show that it was 
vigorously investigating and punishing sexual misconduct.” 
Id.; see also Baum, 903 F.3d at 586; Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 
594. In another context, the Supreme Court has described the 
total withdrawal of federal funding as “economic dragooning” 
and “a gun to the head.” Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 
567 U.S. 519, 581, 582 (2012). Similarly, for most colleges and 
universities, the loss of federal funds would be ruinous.6 
Doe’s complaint focuses on this background. He alleges 
that, after the 2011 Dear Colleague Letter issued, “educational 
institutions like [USciences] limited procedural protections 
afforded to . . . students like [Doe] in sexual misconduct cases.” 
App. 96. And he claims that, although the 2011 Dear Colleague 
Letter was rescinded before his investigation and expulsion, 
USciences kept in place the policies enumerated in that letter. 
In related contexts, Courts of Appeals have carefully 
considered allegations of unfairness against colleges or 
universities that were allegedly intimidated by the 2011 Dear 
Colleague Letter and associated threats of litigation or DoEd 
 
6 “Although the [2011 Dear Colleague Letter] was fashioned 
as a guidance document that itself did not impose any new 
binding legal obligations, OCR initiated investigations into 
dozens of schools for noncompliance with Title IX, utilizing 
interpretations and requirements specified only in the [2011 
Dear Colleague Letter]. The explicit threat was (and remains) 
to terminate all federal funding—upon which virtually all 
institutions of higher education significantly rely—if schools 
did not change their policies and disciplinary procedures to 
comply.” Jacob Gersen & Jeannie Suk, The Sex Bureaucracy, 
104 Calif. L. Rev. 881, 931–32 (2016). 
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scrutiny. See, e.g., Purdue Univ., 928 F.3d at 668; Baum, 903 
F.3d at 586; Miami Univ., 882 F.3d at 594; cf. Columbia Univ., 
831 F.3d at 58 (recognizing plausibility of allegations that 
university acted with bias because of public criticism of its 
handling of Title IX claims). The backdrop of Doe’s complaint 
informs our consideration of the fairness that USciences 
promises students accused of sexual misconduct.   
1 
 Procedural fairness is a well-worn concept. 
Pennsylvania courts have made clear that, at private 
universities, “basic principles of . . . fundamental fairness [are] 
adhered to [when] the students involved[ ] . . . [are] given 
notice of the charges and evidence against them, [are] allowed 
to be present and to participate in the hearing assisted by 
faculty, to call their own witnesses and to cross-examine the 
witnesses against them, and [are] fully apprised of the findings 
of the [h]earing [p]anel.” Psi Upsilon of Phila. v. Univ. of Pa., 
591 A.2d 755, 758 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991). 
In other private-university cases, Pennsylvania courts 
have similarly determined that fairness includes the chance to 
cross-examine witnesses and the ability to participate in a live, 
adversarial hearing during which the accused may present 
evidence and a defense. In Boehm, the court held that the 
private university’s disciplinary proceedings were 
“fundamentally fair” because the procedures included (1) 
giving notice of charges to the accused students; (2) presenting 
the accused students with the evidence against them; (3) 
allowing the accused students to be present for and to 
participate in a live hearing; (4) permitting the accused students 
to be assisted by a faculty adviser during the hearing; (5) 
allowing the cross-examination of witnesses; and (6) 
permitting the accused students to call their own witnesses. 573 
A.2d at 582. And in Reardon, the court found that a private 
university provided the accused with a fair process by 
“provid[ing] for minimum procedural safeguards—notice, the 
admission of relevant testimony, the right to call witnesses and 
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present evidence, and the right to be represented by a member 
of the college community.” 926 A.2d at 482.7 
In short, notions of fairness in Pennsylvania law include 
providing the accused with a chance to test witness credibility 
through some form of cross-examination and a live, adversarial 
hearing during which he or she can put on a defense and 
challenge evidence against him or her. 
2 
 As a private university, USciences is not subject to the 
Constitution’s due process guarantees. Nevertheless, we 
observe that federal notions of fairness in student disciplinary 
proceedings are consistent with those recognized in 
Pennsylvania’s jurisprudence. They require, at a minimum, 
“rudimentary precautions against unfair or mistaken findings 
of misconduct and arbitrary exclusion from school.” Goss v. 
Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581 (1975). And as in Pennsylvania, the 
basic elements of federal procedural fairness in a Title IX 
sexual-misconduct proceeding include a real, meaningful 
hearing and, when credibility determinations are at issue, the 
opportunity for cross-examination of witnesses. See Purdue 
Univ., 928 F.3d at 663–64 (holding that, among other things, 
procedural fairness requires “a hearing [to] be a real one, not a 
sham or pretense” and some “attempt to examine [the 
accuser’s] credibility” (citation omitted)); Baum, 903 F.3d at 
581 (holding that procedural fairness means that “(1) if a 
student is accused of misconduct, the university must hold 
some sort of hearing before imposing a sanction as serious as 
expulsion or suspension, and (2) when the university's 
determination turns on the credibility of the accuser, the 
accused, or witnesses, that hearing must include an opportunity 
for cross-examination”).  
 
7 Consistent with Pennsylvania’s private-university decisions, 
the Pennsylvania Administrative Code requires universities in 
the State System of Higher Education to adopt procedures that 
guarantee a hearing with “[a]n opportunity for submission of 
written, physical and testimonial evidence and for reasonable 
questioning of witnesses by both parties.” 22 Pa. Code § 505.3; 
see also Ruane v. Shippensburg Univ., 871 A.2d 859, 862 (Pa. 
Commw. Ct. 2005).  
19 
 
* * * 
We hold that USciences’s contractual promises of “fair” 
and “equitable” treatment to those accused of sexual 
misconduct require at least a real, live, and adversarial hearing 
and the opportunity for the accused student or his or her 
representative to cross-examine witnesses—including his or 
her accusers.8 We do not, however, attempt to prescribe the 
exact method by which a college or university must implement 
these procedures. 
C 
We now consider whether Doe plausibly alleges that 
USciences failed to provide him fairness. In his complaint, Doe 
claims that “[t]he conduct of the entire process . . . violat[ed] 
the guarantees of fundamental fairness and fair and impartial 
hearing.” App. 114. Doe also alleges that he “was prohibited 
from confronting his accusers” and that he “was not allowed to 
have a hearing before a panel.” Id. In particular, Doe alleges 
that the sexual assault claims against him hinged on credibility 
and so, without a hearing, the charges went unexamined in a 
meaningful way. From these allegations, we draw the 
reasonable inference that USciences failed to provide Doe a 
fair, equitable investigation and resolution process. In other 
words, Doe plausibly alleges that USciences deprived him of 
fairness because he never received a chance to cross-examine 
witnesses or any sort of real, live, and adversarial hearing. 
 USciences argues that, under Pennsylvania law, it need 
not provide Doe with a “full-dress judicial hearing.” 
Appellee’s Br. at 31. We agree. Basic fairness in this context 
does not demand the full panoply of procedural protections 
available in courts. But it does include the modest procedural 
protections of a live, meaningful, and adversarial hearing and 
the chance to test witnesses’ credibility through some method 
of cross-examination.  
 
8 Doe does not allege that USciences failed to provide him 
fairness by employing the preponderance-of-the-evidence 
standard to adjudicate charges of sexual assault, so we do not 
address that question.  
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 USciences also claims that the procedures outlined in 
the Student Handbook and the Policy satisfy the requirements 
of basic fairness because Doe had a chance to be heard by the 
investigator and received other procedural protections. The 
District Court accepted this argument, concluding that Doe 
received a fair and equitable process because USciences 
afforded him the following procedural protections: 
(1) the time, date, sexual nature, 
and locations of the alleged 
incidents, as well as the identities 
of his accusers; (2) more than one 
opportunity to review the witness 
statements attached to the Report; 
(3) more than one opportunity to 
defend himself before the 
investigator, including the 
opportunity to provide an 
additional statement to her after 
reviewing the investigator’s 
preliminary report; (4) the benefit 
of an administrative panel, distinct 
from the investigator, to determine 
his punishment, and yet another 
administrative panel to review his 
appeal of the initial panel’s 
determination; and (5) the 
opportunity to identify witnesses 
in his defense—a right which he 
exercised with such alacrity that 
seven of the ten total witnesses 
(excluding Roes 1 & 2) were 
people Doe identified[.] 
App. 22–23 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). 
USciences therefore argues that the process it provided Doe—
its implementation of the single-investigator model—is fair.  
To be sure, the investigator listened to Doe during her 
two interviews with him. But USciences did not provide Doe a 
real, live, and adversarial hearing. Nor did USciences permit 
Doe to cross-examine witnesses—including his accusers, 
Roe 1 and Roe 2. As we explained above, basic fairness in the 
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context of sexual-assault investigations requires that students 
accused of sexual assault receive these procedural protections. 
Thus, Doe states a plausible claim that, at least as it has been 
implemented here, the single-investigator model violated the 
fairness that USciences promises students accused of sexual 
misconduct. 
V 
 Doe’s complaint includes enough factual allegations to 
state a claim for relief under Title IX. Doe also states a 
plausible claim that USciences breached its contractual 
obligation to provide him fairness. We will reverse the District 
Court’s order and remand this case for proceedings consistent 
with our opinion.  
